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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine trying to patent a soufflé, using only the recipe to 
define what it is.  If you have never seen a soufflé, you would not 
necessarily know how to identify it based on the recipe used to 
make it.  You would only describe a soufflé in this manner if you 
lacked the words to describe the structural characteristics, such as 
size, density, and other appropriate measures.  What happens if the 
recipe only describes soufflés that are four inches in diameter?  
Should you be able to assert that you have described every type of 
soufflé that can be made? 
This is the problem that courts have struggled with for many 
years with regard to product-by-process claim construction.  These 
claims use the process by which a product is created to define the 
invention, instead of just claiming the structural elements as a 
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typical product claim would.1  The patent statutes do not 
specifically allow for product-by-process claims—they are a 
creation of the Patent Office and the courts.2  Recently, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) 
again attempted to address the issue of product-by-process claim 
construction, but failed to give much clarity or correctness to the 
subject.3  In fact, the two judges of the Federal Circuit that have 
advocated differing approaches to product-by-process claim 
construction have both called for an en banc decision to decide this 
controversial issue.4  Much of the problem with these claims is the 
inherent ambiguity when claiming the invention of a product in 
process language.  This Note will discuss the ways that courts have 
grappled with this problem and will suggest a path out of the 
current legal morass. 
Product-by-process claims are an acceptable form of claiming 
an invention in U.S. patent law.5  These claims are used to define 
an invention when the structural elements are more difficult to 
claim.6  However, these claims are often avoided because the 
Federal Circuit has issued conflicting decisions in the Scripps 
Clinic and Atlantic Thermoplastics cases regarding the scope of 
these types of claims.7  Separate panels of the Federal Circuit 
issued these two decisions sixteen months apart, and the en banc 
Federal Circuit reviewed neither case.8  Some district courts have 
applied the first decision because the first decision of two 
conflicting decisions is binding precedent.  Other courts have 
 
 1 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, § 2113 
(8th ed., rev. 4 2005) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
 2 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 3 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006), 
reh’g en banc denied, 453 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 4 SmithKline, 453 F.3d at 1347 (Newman, J., and Rader, J., dissenting separately from 
the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 5 MPEP, supra note 1. 
 6 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.05 (2006). 
 7 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (holding that product-by-process claims “are not limited to product prepared by the 
process set forth in the claims”); Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp. 970 F.2d 834, 
846–47 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that “process terms in product-by-process claims serve 
as limitations in determining infringement”), reh’g en banc denied, 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
 8 Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (rehearing en banc denied). 
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found the rationale in the second case more compelling.9  Quite 
obviously, this has created great uncertainty in the law, making the 
scope of product-by-process claims ill-defined.10 
Claim construction has always been one of the most hotly 
contested areas of patent law because every patent infringement 
lawsuit requires figuring out what the invention actually is.11  After 
the Markman decision, claim construction is a matter of law, 
normally determined during a hearing before a jury is 
empanelled.12  The recent decision in Phillips v. AWH eliminated a 
primary focus on dictionary definitions to determine the scope of 
claims and reaffirmed the central role of the specification in 
helping courts determine the actual scope of patent protection.13  
But what these decisions have not done is create more certainty for 
claim construction at the District Court level.  According to one 
study, claim construction is reversed on appeal 34.5% of the 
time.14 
Despite the inherent ambiguities in product-by-process claims, 
certain industries have a special interest in claiming their 
inventions using product-by-process language.  One industry 
where product inventions are often described in process language 
is the pharmaceutical industry.15  By defining compounds by their 
 
 9 For cases that follow Scripps, see, for example, Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., 
Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 430 (D.N.J. 2005); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Armstrong World 
Indus., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 594 (D. Del. 2002); Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Roche 
Diagnostics GmbH, 126 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D. Mass. 2000); DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. 
Northrup King Co., No. 96 C 50169, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14275 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 
1997) (marked not for publication).  For cases that follow Atlantic Thermoplastics, see, 
for example, Kennametal, Inc. v. Cerametal S.A.R.L., No. 99-CV-74678-DT, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25284 (E.D. Mich. May 10, 2001); Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc., 825 F. 
Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993); Fairfax Dental Ltd. v. Sterling Optical Corp., 808 F. Supp. 326 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 10 CHISUM, supra note 6. 
 11 Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
 12 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 
517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 13 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 14 Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More 
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005). 
 15 Mark D. Passler, Product-By-Process Patent Claims: Majority of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit Forgets Purpose of the Patent Act, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
233, 234 (1994). 
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method of manufacture or synthesis, the inventor is hedging his bet 
as to which claims would actually stand up during an infringement 
suit.16  When there are hundreds of millions, if not billions, of 
dollars on the line when a drug loses patent protection, product-by-
process claims can often become crucial.17 
The controversy over product-by-process claiming also 
highlights unique issues of appellate procedure and faithfulness to 
precedent.  The Federal Circuit is unique in that its appellate 
jurisdiction is not limited by geography, but by subject matter.18  
When Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, it wanted to 
create a court that would set national standards, especially in patent 
law.19  Disagreement among the other circuits usually aids the 
evolution of national standards, as the Supreme Court benefits 
from the deliberation and analysis of the several courts in 
ultimately reaching its decision.20  But for the Federal Circuit, 
there should never be a situation akin to a circuit split.21  Any 
conflicting precedent should be resolved by the en banc court.22  
However, when the Atlantic Thermoplastics case was appealed for 
en banc review, the full court refused to hear the case, with the 
dissenters possessing a completely different interpretation of the 
scope of the controlling precedent of the Scripps case.23  So not 
only did two conflicting precedents arise out of the two decisions, 
but the court was also split on the procedural aspect of how 
conflicting precedents should be resolved.24  The recent decision in 
 
 16 See In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216, 1219 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
 17 Passler, supra note 15, at 234. 
 18 28 U.S.C.S. § 1295(a)(1) (2006). 
 19 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 1 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 11. 
 20 See, e.g., Judicial and Admin. Review of Immigration Decisions: Testimony before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Prof. David A. Martin), 
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1845&wit_id=673 (arguing 
against placing immigration appeals within the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit). 
 21 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13 (stating 
that the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is defined in terms of subject matter, rather than 
geography). 
 22 FED. CIR. R. 35(a). 
 23 Atl. Thermoplastics, Co., 974 F.2d 1279. 
 24 Id. 
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SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex has done little to resolve the 
conflicts between the two decisions.25 
Though there are situations where product-by-process claims 
are needed, this method of claiming is such an inferior way to 
claim an invention that every effort should be made to exclude the 
practice from use.  For claims that already exist, there should be a 
renewed emphasis on whether or not the invention was 
distinctively described.  These issues of law will have to be 
decided by the Federal Circuit en banc, the Supreme Court or by 
an act of Congress.  Another contradictory panel decision would 
only serve to further muddy the waters in an already murky area of 
patent jurisprudence.  This would restore much of the balance 
missing in today’s product-by-process claim construction 
jurisprudence. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the current state of product-by-
process claim construction case law.  Part II will examine why that 
precedent is hopelessly contradictory.  Finally, Part III will argue 
for a newly restrictive regime where product-by-process claims are 
strongly disfavored, with an eye to foreign patent systems as a 
guide for the U.S. patent system. 
I. THE HISTORY OF PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
A. Supreme Court Precedent 
There is a series of cases from the 1880s that do have some 
relevance for any discussion of product-by-process claims.  
However, since these decisions antedate so much of the modern 
techniques of patent drafting, much of their precedential weight is 
undercut. 
In Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, the Supreme Court 
reviewed an infringement suit where the product claim had a 
reference to the process used to make it in the specification.26  The 
 
 25 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 26 Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 223 (1880). 
MASKEL_FORMATTED_102606.DOC 11/1/2006  12:05 PM 
2006 PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 121 
patent concerned a set of dentures made out of vulcanized rubber27 
where the specification described the process used to make it.28  
The defendant made a set of dentures out of celluloid, which did 
not require vulcanization.29  The court held: “[c]elluloid is not an 
equivalent for the material which the patent makes essential to the 
invention, and in the use of it for a dental plate, the process which 
is inseparable from the invention is not, and cannot be, 
employed.”30  The court read the process limitations into the claim, 
even though the products were distinguishable. 
Four years later, the Supreme Court reviewed another claim 
similar to modern product-by-process claims.31  Here, the Supreme 
Court analyzed a patent for an artificially made dye that can also 
be found in nature.32  The claim covered the dye itself and it 
referenced a particular method for making it.33  The patentee sued 
another patent holder that had made the same dye, but instead used 
an entirely different process.34  The Court held that: 
[U]nless it is shown that the process of No. 4,321 
[plaintiff’s patent] was followed to produce the defendant’s 
article, or unless it is shown that that article could not be 
produced by any other process, the defendant’s article 
cannot be identified as the product of the process of No. 
4,321.  Nothing of the kind is shown.35 
 
 27 “Vulcanization, or curing of rubber, is a chemical process in which individual 
polymer molecules are linked to other polymer molecules by atomic bridges. The end 
result is that the springy rubber molecules become cross-linked to a greater or lesser 
extent. This makes the bulk material harder, much more durable and also more resistant 
to chemical attack. It also makes the surface of the material smoother and prevents it 
from sticking to metal or plastic chemical catalysts.” WIKIPEDIA, Vulcanization, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Vulcanization&oldid=75592500 (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2006). 
 28 Goodyear, 102 U.S. at 222. 
 29 Id. at 228–29. 
 30 Id. at 230. 
 31 Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884). 
 32 Id. at 294–96. 
 33 Id. at 296. 
 34 Id. at 310. 
 35 Id. 
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The Court also went on to give an alternative holding.36  There, 
the Court said that the dye itself was not patentable because the 
dye constituted prior art to the plaintiff’s patent.37  Thus, the Court 
held that the patent was for the novel process used to make the 
dye.38 
Three years later, in the Plummer case, the Court looked again 
at a version of product-by-process claiming.39  The patent at issue 
in this case was for “‘the new manufacture hereinabove described, 
consisting of iron ornamented in imitation of bronze by the 
application of oil and heat, substantially as described.’”40  But 
because of a process already known in the prior art, the Court held 
that the patent for the product was only novel because of the 
process used to make it.41  Thus, the only way to construe the 
patent as not anticipated necessarily implied that there was no 
infringement.42  The Court did not lay down a blanket rule that all 
product-by-process claims are novel; rather, the Court held that a 
process limitation had to be read into this claim to make it novel. 
B. Patentability and the P.T.O. 
Following United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(“C.C.P.A.,” a forerunner court to the Federal Circuit that had 
jurisdiction over appeals from the Patent Office) and Federal 
Circuit precedent, the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“P.T.O.”) follows the rule that “product-by-process claims are not 
limited to the manipulations of the recited steps, only the structure 
implied by the steps.”43  The P.T.O. also cites In re Thorpe for the 
rule that: 
[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by 
and defined by the process, determination of patentability is 
based on the product itself.  The patentability of a product 
 
 36 Id. at 311–13. 
 37 Id. at 311. 
 38 See id. at 310–12. 
 39 Plummer v. Sargent, 120 U.S. 442 (1887). 
 40 Id. at 445 (quoting the text of the patent application). 
 41 Id. at 449. 
 42 Id. 
 43 MPEP, supra note 1, § 2113. 
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does not depend on its method of production.  If the 
product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or 
obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is 
unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a 
different process.44 
This rule is consistent with the maxim that claims should be 
given their broadest possible interpretation when examining their 
patentability.45  These rules balance two competing public policy 
goals of the P.T.O.  On one hand, giving proposed claims their 
broadest possible interpretation “reduce[es] the possibility that 
claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is 
justified . . . .”46  On the other hand, it is not unfair to applicants, 
because “‘before a patent is granted the claims are readily amended 
as part of the examination process.’”47 
Prior to this current rule, the C.C.P.A. had a long debate over 
whether or not product-by-process claiming could be used when 
the product could only be described in process language, the so-
called “Rule of Necessity.”48  This rule is now less strictly 
enforced, but much of the debate over the scope of the rule greatly 
informs the current problems the Federal Circuit faces in 
determining the scope of product-by-process claims. 
The Rule of Necessity originated in a decision on patentability 
by the Commissioner of Patents in 1891.49  In Painter, the product 
was defined “wholly by the process of making it.”50  While 
acknowledging that as a general rule “a claim for an article of 
manufacture should not be defined by the process of producing that 
article,”51 the Commissioner held: 
When the case arises that an article of manufacture is a new 
thing, a useful thing, and embodies invention, and that 
article cannot be properly defined and discriminated from 
 
 44 Id. (citing In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 45 See, e.g., In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 46 Id. (citing In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 47 Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 48 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.05[2][a]. 
 49 Ex parte Painter, 1891 C.D. 200, 57 O.G. 999 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1891). 
 50 Id. at 200, 57.O.G. at 999. 
 51 Id., 57 O.G. at 999. 
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the prior art otherwise than by reference to the process of 
producing it, a case is presented which constitutes a proper 
exception to the rule.52 
This was the rule cited by the Patent Office in one form or 
another prior to the adoption of the major revisions of U.S. patent 
law in 1952.53 
Following the adoption of the 1952 Act,54 the C.C.P.A. could 
not settle on one rule for the patentability of product-by-process 
claims for over twenty years.55  In In re Steppan, the C.C.P.A. held 
that there was no statutory basis to sustain the Rule of Necessity.56  
One year later, the C.C.P.A. reaffirmed the Rule of Necessity, 
holding that “a claim for an article capable of such definition must 
define the article by its structure and not by the process of making 
it.”57  Two years later, after deciding Steppan, the C.C.P.A. did not 
specifically reject the Rule of Necessity, but cited Steppan 
favorably in holding that the applicant met the requirement of 35 
U.S.C. § 112 that the invention be distinctively claimed.58  Finally, 
Hughes did not specifically reject the Rule of Necessity, but said 
that it was not founded on section 112.59  Instead, it refused to 
reject the rule because it had such a sound policy justification.60 
 
 52 Id. at 201, 57 O.G. at 1000. 
 53 See In re Lifton, 189 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Shortell, 173 F.2d 993 
(C.C.P.A. 1949); In re Moeller, 117 F.2d 565 (C.C.P.A. 1941); In re McKee, 95 F.2d 264 
(C.C.P.A. 1938); In re Dreyfus, 75 F.2d 501 (C.C.P.A. 1935); In re Grupe, 48 F.2d 936 
(C.C.P.A. 1931); In re Butler, 37 F.2d 623 (C.C.P.A. 1930); In re Brown, 29 F.2d 873 
(D.C. Cir. 1928); Ex parte Fesenmeier, 1922 C.D. 18, 302 O.G. 199, (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 
1922). 
 54 Bryson Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952). 
 55 In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345 
(C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Johnson, 394 F.2d 591 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Steppan, 394 F.2d 
1013 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 56 Steppan, 394 F.2d at 1019. 
 57 Johnson, 394 F.2d at 594. 
 58 Pilkington, 411 F.2d at 1349–50. 
 59 Hughes, 496 F.2d at 1218. 
 60 Id. 
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C. The Scripps Decision 
The Scripps case concerned an infringement suit over a patent 
for a protein essential to blood clotting, Human Factor VIII:C.61  
The claim at issue in the case was: “[h]ighly purified and 
concentrated human or porcine VIII:C prepared in accordance with 
the method of claim 1.”62  At issue with regard to the product-by-
process claims was the district court’s denial of summary judgment 
for infringement of these claims.63  The court (with an opinion 
written by Judge Pauline Newman) then cited a number of 
C.C.P.A. decisions on patentability for the proposition that “[the 
rule that] product-by-process claims would not be infringed unless 
the same process were practiced . . . appears to diverge from our 
precedent.”64  The court then held: 
In determining patentability we construe the product as not 
limited by the process stated in the claims.  Since claims 
must be construed the same way for validity and for 
infringement, the correct reading of product-by-process 
claims is that they are not limited to product prepared by 
the process set forth in the claims.65 
As a result, the court ruled that summary judgment was 
incorrect and remanded to the district court.66 
 
 61 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
 62 Id. at 1570. Claim 1 was: 
1. An improved method of preparing Factor VIII procoagulant activity protein 
comprising the steps of 
(a) adsorbing a VIII:C/VIII:RP complex from a plasma or commercial 
concentrate source onto particles bound to a monoclonal antibody specific 
to VIII:RP, 
(b) eluting the VIII:C, 
(c) adsorbing the VIII:C obtained in step (b) in another adsorption to 
concentrate and further purify same, 
(d) eluting the adsorbed VIII:C, and 
(e) recovering highly purified and concentrated VIII:C. 
Id. 
 63 Id. at 1583. 
 64 Id. (citing In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 
535 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1966)). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 1584. 
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D. The Atlantic Thermoplastics Case 
Sixteen months after the Scripps decision, a different three-
judge panel of the Federal Circuit handed down another decision 
that hinged on the construction of product-by-process claims.67  In 
Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex, the court examined the appeal 
of a trial verdict that held the Faytex Corporation liable for 
infringement of Atlantic Thermoplastics’ patent for a shock-
absorbing innersole.68  The claim at issue was: “The molded 
innersole produced by the method of claim 1.”69  The district court 
held that because the process that Faytex used was different from 
the process included in Atlantic Thermoplastics’ product-by-
process claim, Faytex did not infringe the product-by-process 
claim.70 
However, in deciding the infringement issue, this Federal 
Circuit panel refused to use the rule of Scripps and instead stated in 
a footnote, “[a] decision that fails to consider Supreme Court 
precedent does not control if the court determines that the prior 
panel would have reached a different conclusion if it had 
considered controlling precedent.  For the reasons set forth below, 
we necessarily so conclude.”71  The court then evaluated a series of 
Supreme Court and C.C.P.A. decisions and concluded, “[I]n both 
 
 67 Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992), reh’g en 
banc denied, 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 68 Id. at 835. 
 69 Id. at 836.  The method of Claim 1 was: 
(a) introducing an expandable, polyurethane into a mold; and 
(b) recovering from the mold an innersole which comprises a contoured heel 
and arch section composed of a substantially open-celled polyurethane foam 
material, the improvement which comprises: 
(i) placing an elastomeric insert material into the mold, the insert material 
having greater shock-absorbing properties and being less resilient than the 
molded, open-celled polyurethane foam material, and the insert material 
having sufficient surface tack to remain in the placed position in the mold 
on the introduction of the expandable polyurethane material so as to 
permit the expandable polyurethane material to expand about the insert 
material without displacement of the insert material; and 
(ii) recovering a molded innersole with the insert material having a tacky 
surface forming a part of the exposed bottom surface of the recovered 
innersole. Id. at 835–36. 
 70 Id. at 836. 
 71 Id. at 838–39 n.2 (citations omitted). 
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patentability actions before the CCPA and infringement actions 
before the Supreme Court or the regional circuits, the courts 
regarded the process language in product-by-process claims as 
limiting the claim.”72  But the court also noted that prior precedent 
with regard only to patentability set forth the rule that, “even 
though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by 
the process, determination of patentability is based on the product 
itself.”73  Thus, the court held that process steps form claim 
limitations for the purposes of infringement, the court affirmed the 
ruling of the district court and found that Faytex did not infringe 
the product-by-process claim.74 
The Atlantic Thermoplastics decision provoked an 
extraordinarily heated response when the Federal Circuit rejected a 
petition to rehear the case before the en banc court.75  Judges Nies, 
Rich, Newman and Lourie all filed dissenting opinions against the 
denial of en banc review.76  Judge Nies expressed no opinion on 
the merits of either side’s arguments, but did vote for the en banc 
court to hear the case.77  Judge Rich blasted the panel both for 
being wrong in its claim interpretation, but worst of all totally 
ignoring the precedential rules of the court.78  Judge Rich wrote 
that the footnote describing the panel’s reason why it chose not to 
follow the Scripps decision was “not only insulting to the Scripps 
panel (Chief Judge Markey, Judge Newman and a visiting judge), 
it is mutiny.  It is heresy.  It is illegal.”79  Judge Rich also added a 
comment that has guided many lower courts that have evaluated 
 
 72 Id. at 845. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 847. 
 75 Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d 1279. 
 76 Id.  Federal Circuit rules require that attorneys acting on behalf of their clients 
include one of two statements when asking for an en banc rehearing: “Based on my 
professional judgment, I believe the panel decision is contrary to the following 
decision(s) of the Supreme Court of the United States or the precedent(s) of this court: 
(cite specific decisions).  [or] Based on my professional judgment, I believe this appeal 
requires an answer to one or more precedent-setting questions of exceptional importance: 
(set forth each question in a separate sentence).” FED CIR. R. 35(b)(2). 
 77 Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1280 (Nies, J., dissenting on the denial of rehearing 
en banc). 
 78 Id. at 1280–81 (Rich, J., dissenting on the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 79 Id. at 1281. 
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product-by-process claims, stating that, “[f]ortunately, this court 
has another rule—as yet to be ignored by a panel, I believe—that 
where there are conflicting precedents, the earlier precedent 
controls. But the conflict should have been eliminated in banc to 
avoid confusion in the law.”80  Judge Lourie (joined by Judges 
Rich and Newman) also questioned both the way that the panel 
addressed the precedential weight of the Scripps decision81 and the 
breadth of its holding on process steps informing claim 
limitations.82 
Judge Newman’s dissent (joined by Judges Rich and Lourie) is 
the most interesting here because she filed opinions in all of the 
three most recent cases on product-by-process claims.83  She first 
identified the Atlantic Thermoplastics claim as not a true product-
by-process claim.84  She suggested a three-tiered classification 
scheme for claims that have process elements: 
(1) [W]hen the product is new and unobvious, but is not 
capable of independent definition; (2) when the product is 
old or obvious, but the process is new; (3) when the product 
is new and unobvious, but has a process-based limitation 
(e.g. a “molded” product).  Type (2) includes the Atlantic 
class of claim; such claims are examined as process claims, 
their validity depends on the novelty and unobviousness of 
the process, and they are infringed only when the process is 
used. Type (1) is the Scripps class of claim; such claims are 
examined as product claims, their validity depends on the 
novelty and unobviousness of the product, and they are 
infringed by the product however made. Indeed, claims of 
types (2) and (3) are not properly called “product-by-
 
 80 Id. 
 81 “[I]t is contrary to our case law and procedures for a panel to act contrary to a prior 
precedent of this court.  If this panel thought Scripps was wrongly decided (and I do not), 
it was either bound to follow our precedents or to seek an in banc review.” Id. at 1298 
(citation omitted) (Lourie, J., dissenting on the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 82 Id. at 1298–99. 
 83 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (Newman, J., dissenting); Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1281 (Newman, J., 
dissenting on the denial of rehearing en banc); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 84 Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1282. 
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process” claims, if that term is used with precision.85 
(footnote omitted) 
Judge Newman then specifically rebutted each of the cases that 
the panel cited as precedent to bolster this three-tier scheme.86  In 
Judge Newman’s view, by classifying the claims in Scripps and 
Atlantic Thermoplastics as distinguishable, there was no need for 
the Atlantic Thermoplastics panel to determine that there was a 
conflict with Supreme Court precedent.87 
E. District Court Decisions after Scripps and Atlantic 
Thermoplastics 
District courts have not consistently followed either the Scripps 
decision or the Atlantic Thermoplastics decision.88  These district 
court opinions exemplify how difficult it is to make any 
meaningful distinction between the two decisions.89  This 
subsection examines how district courts have applied these 
conflicting rules. 
 
 85 Id. at 1284.  See also Eric P. Mirabel, Product-by-Process Claims: A Practical 
Perspective, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 3 (1986). 
 86 Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1285–97. 
 87 Id. at 1283. 
 88 For cases that follow Scripps, see, for example, Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., 
Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 430 (D.N.J. 2005); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Armstrong World 
Indus., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 594 (D. Del. 2002); Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Roche 
Diagnostics GmbH, 126 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D. Mass. 2000); DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. 
Northrup King Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14275 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (marked not for 
publication).  For cases that follow Atlantic Thermoplastics, see, for example, 
Kennametal, Inc. v. Cerametal s.a.r.l., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25284 (E.D. Mich. 2001); 
Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993); Fairfax Dental Ltd. v. 
Sterling Optical Corp., 808 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 89 In fact, many courts have expressed frustration at the lack of guidance that the 
Federal Circuit has provided for this type of claim construction. See Trs. of Columbia 
Univ., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (“Plainly, the law on this issue is in a state of uncertainty.  
By denying the rehearing en banc, not only are lower courts left with little guidance, but 
so are the inventors and investors of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries 
who must make research and development decisions not knowing how much protection is 
available to a claim for a novel biological or chemical product.”); DeKalb Genetics 
Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14275, at *5–6 (“It cannot be questioned that there is a 
direct conflict between the rule enunciated in Scripps and the one set forth in Atlantic 
Thermoplastics.”); Tropix, 825 F. Supp. at 8 (“Unfortunately, the judges of the Federal 
Circuit Court are in open disagreement on the point, making such a prediction 
hazardous.”). 
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1. District Court Rulings That Follow Scripps 
At least four district court rulings have sided with the Scripps 
court.90  Most recently, in Aventis Pharmaceuticals, the court ruled 
on a defendants’ summary judgment motion based on the 
invalidity of the product-by-process claims at issue in the suit.91  
The court opted to follow the Scripps decision because it was the 
earlier precedent.92  That rationale was also compelling for the 
Trustees of Columbia University and DeKalb Genetics cases.93  In 
Mannington Mills, the court found the Scripps decision more 
compelling in part because adding process clauses “imparts no 
patentability to the product resulting from the process.”94  In total, 
the primary justification for following the Scripps court was to 
follow precedent in the manner advocated by Judge Rich in his 
Atlantic Thermoplastics dissent.95 
2. District Court Rulings That Follow Atlantic Thermoplastics 
By contrast, other district courts have chosen to follow Atlantic 
Thermoplastics.96  The Tropix court agreed with the rationale of 
Atlantic Thermoplastics more than any other district court.97  The 
decision in Tropix was a memorandum of controlling law on the 
scope of product-by-process claims at issue in the suit.98  The court 
recognized the confused state of the law and decided to “apply the 
 
 90 Aventis Pharms., 372 F. Supp. 2d 430; Mannington Mills, 218 F. Supp. 2d 594; Trs. 
of Columbia Univ., 126 F. Supp. 2d 16; DeKalb Genetics Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14275. 
 91 Aventis Pharms., 372 F. Supp. 2d at 433. 
 92 Id. at 437 n.4. 
 93 Trs. of Columbia Univ., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (“Until the Scripps decision is rejected 
by a hearing en banc, it is the precedential decision.”); DeKalb Genetics Corp., 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14275, at *6 (“Accordingly, applying the direct conflict rule, the court will 
apply Scripps in the present case.”). 
 94 Mannington Mills, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 599.  Note, however, that this statement is not 
at odds with Atlantic Thermoplastics.  There the court held that process terms are read 
into the claim only for purposes of determining infringement, not patentability. 
 95 Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 96 Kennametal, Inc. v. Cerametal s.a.r.l., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25284 (E.D. Mich. 
2001); Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993); Fairfax Dental Ltd. 
v. Sterling Optical Corp., 808 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 97 Tropix, 825 F. Supp. 7. 
 98 Id. 
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rule which [appeared] to be most consonant with the main stream 
of existing authority and the purpose of the governing statute.”99  
After a thorough review of product-by-process claim 
jurisprudence,100 the court held that Judge Newman’s belief in 
Scripps that there should be symmetry between claim construction 
for patentability and infringement “[did] not appear to be 
supported by any authority, given the different functions of each 
institution.”101  The court finally concluded that it would follow 
Atlantic Thermoplastics because “even in the confused state of the 
record . . . a majority of the judges of the Federal Circuit would 
rule that Atlantic states the controlling law.”102  Other courts have 
also ruled that Atlantic Thermoplastics is controlling precedent 
when a process step was added as a claim limitation during 
prosecution103 and when interpreting a hypothetical product-by-
process claim as a way to apply the Hypothetical Claim Test104 of 
the Doctrine of Equivalents.105 
F. SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex 
In this recent case, SmithKline Beecham sued Apotex for 
infringing its patent for the drug Paxil (whose chemical name is 
paroxetine).106  The district court granted summary judgment for 
 
 99 Id. at 8. 
 100 Id. at 8–10. 
 101 Id. at 10. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See Kennametal, Inc. v. Cerametal s.a.r.l., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25284, at *33–34 
(E.D. Mich. 2001) (bolstering support for using Atlantic Thermoplastics because of 
Supreme Court precedent based on prosecution history estoppel). 
 104 “The Doctrine of Equivalents allows a patent owner to hold as infringement a 
product or process that does not correspond to the literal terms of a patent’s claim but 
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same 
result as the claimed subject matter.” CHISUM, supra note 6, § 18.04.  “It is well settled 
law that a patentee cannot assert a range of equivalents that encompasses the prior art.  
To test this limit, the notion of a hypothetical claim may be useful.  A hypothetical claim 
may be constructed to literally cover the accused device.  If such a claim would be 
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103, then the patentee has overreached, and the 
accused device is noninfringing as a matter of law.” Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite 
Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).  These patent 
doctrines will not be discussed further because they are well outside the scope of this 
Note. 
 105 Fairfax Dental Ltd. v. Sterling Optical Corp., 808 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 106 SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 439 F.3d 1312, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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Apotex, holding that the patent at issue was anticipated by a 
previous patent held by SmithKline.107  The patent at issue claimed 
the compound paroxetine, but did not define it in terms of its 
structural characteristics, instead claiming the compound as the 
end result of the process required to make the pill.108  The prior art 
reference was an invalid patent109 obtained by SmithKline that 
covered paroxetine as a compound without any reference to 
process steps.110 
After surveying the controversy over the Scripps and Atlantic 
Thermoplastics decisions, the court stated: “Regardless of how 
broadly or narrowly one construes a product-by-process claim, it is 
clear that such claims are always to a product, not a process.”111  
After a survey of the relevant C.C.P.A. and Supreme Court 
decisions, the court held: 
As this history of cases from the Supreme Court, our court, 
and our predecessor court make clear, anticipation by an 
earlier product patent cannot be avoided by claiming the 
 
 107 Id. at 1314–15. 
 108 The two claims at issue in the litigation were: Claim 1. A pharmaceutical 
composition in tablet form containing paroxetine, produced on a commercial scale by a 
process which comprises the steps of: 
a) dry admixing paroxetine and excipients in a mixer to form a mixture; or 
b) dry admixing paroxetine and excipients, compressing the resulting 
combination into a slug material or roller compacting the resulting combination 
into a strand material, and milling the prepared material into a free flowing 
mixture; and 
c) compressing the mixture into tablets. 
Claim 2. A pharmaceutical composition in tablet form according to claim 1 containing an 
amount of paroxetine selected from 10 mg, 20 mg, 30 mg, 40 mg and 50 mg, wherein the 
amount of paroxetine is expressed as the free base, produced on a commercial scale by a 
process which comprises the steps of: 
a) dry admixing paroxetine and excipients in a mixer to form a mixture; or 
b) dry admixing paroxetine and excipients, compressing the resulting 
combination into a slug material or roller compacting the resulting combination 
into a strand material, and milling the prepared material into a free flowing 
mixture; and 
c) compressing the mixture into tablets using a single punch or rotary tablet 
machine. Id. at 1314. 
 109 The court noted that invalid patents still constitute prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) 
as of the date the patent is published. Id. at 1317 n.5. 
 110 Id. at 1313. 
 111 Id. at 1317. 
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same product more narrowly in a product-process claim.  It 
makes no difference here whether the ’944 patent’s 
product-by-process claims are construed broadly to cover 
the product made by any process or narrowly to cover only 
the product made by a dry admixing process.  Either way, 
anticipation by an earlier product disclosure (which 
disclosed the product itself) cannot be avoided.  While the 
process set forth in the product-by-process claim may be 
new, that novelty can only be captured by obtaining a 
process claim.  We agree with the district court’s 
conclusion that the ’723 patent disclosure anticipated the 
identical product claimed by the ’944 patent even though 
that product was produced by an allegedly novel process.112 
The court then disregarded an argument that there was a 
substantive difference between the product in the patent at issue (a 
purified tablet form of paroxetine) and the prior art patent 
(paroxetine with an impurity) because it was insufficiently 
developed by the appellant’s brief.113  Therefore, the court 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.114 
Outvoted as a member of the three-judge panel, Judge Newman 
filed a dissenting opinion.115  On the whole, she echoed many of 
the same themes as her dissenting opinion in Atlantic 
Thermoplastics.116  For one, she rejected the “one-type-fits-all 
pigeonholes for claims, even for claims containing process 
limitations.”117  Though she did not explicitly revive her tripartite 
scheme from Atlantic Thermoplastics, her dissent in SmithKline is 
logically consistent.118  She believed that the product claimed by 
 
 112 Id. at 1318–19. 
 113 Id. at 1320. 
 114 Id. at 1321. 
 115 Id. at 1321–25 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 116 Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 117 SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1322. 
 118 See Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1284.  In this opinion, Judge Newman set out a 
tripartite scheme of claim construction: “(1) when the product is new and unobvious, but 
is not capable of independent definition; (2) when the product is old or obvious, but the 
process is new; (3) when the product is new and unobvious, but has a process-based 
limitation (e.g. a ‘molded’ product).” Id.  Since Judge Newman thought that this form of 
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SmithKline was a novel one, namely a tablet form of paroxetine 
that reduces a particular type of impurity.119  She also concluded 
that the issue was sufficiently preserved on appeal.120  Therefore, 
she would have reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment and remanded the case because she determined that the 
process steps in the claim made the product itself novel and 
patentable.121 
After the panel ruling, the entire Federal Circuit rejected a 
petition for a rehearing en banc, with three out of eleven active 
judges on the court voting instead to grant rehearing.122  Both 
Judge Newman and Judge Rader filed dissents, with Judge Gajarsa 
signing onto both opinions.123  Judge Newman stated: 
Scripps accommodates the situation where the product is 
novel and complex and cannot be described other than by 
the way it was made, while Atlantic Thermoplastics deals 
with a product whose production requires use of a certain 
process, whether or not the product itself is novel. 
In view of the apparent uncertainty within the patent 
community as to the distinction between such situations, it 
is time for this court to interpret the law with one voice.124 
Judge Rader was less sanguine about whether a direct conflict 
existed in product-by-process claim construction jurisprudence: 
This court’s decision in Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. 
Apotex Corp. expands on the existing confusion by 
suggesting that the specific language of the claims is not 
relevant to anticipation.  That additional confusion does a 
disservice to this court’s jurisprudence.  Without doubt, this 
 
paroxetine was a new and unobvious product, she classified it in the first group of 
product-by-process claims. 
 119 SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1322. 
 120 Id. at 1325. 
 121 Id. at 1324. 
 122 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 453 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 1347. 
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court’s product-by-process law contains an apparent 
conflict.125 
II. THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE CURRENT LAW OF 
PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
The morass that the Federal Circuit finds itself in with regard 
to claim construction of product-by-process claims begs for a 
better approach.  This Part analyzes the problems with claim 
construction in the product-by-process context and critiques the 
approaches of the Federal Circuit. 
A. Product-by-Process Claims Are Doubly Troublesome 
The Federal Circuit has in recent years debated the proper role 
of district court judges, juries and the standard of review in claim 
construction.126  Much of this law is still subject to revision, 
leaving district courts unable to reduce the rate of reversal on claim 
construction.127  The lack of agreement on the standard for claim 
construction is only amplified when courts have to examine a 
product-by-process claim. 
When district courts construe a simple product or process 
claim, trial judges have to closely examine every clause of the 
claim to determine what the invention protected by the patent 
actually is.128  The claims are also read in light of the specification 
 
 125 Id. at 1348 (citations omitted).  Note that Judge Rader was the judge who wrote the 
opinion in Atlantic Thermoplastics that created the conflicting authority within the 
Federal Circuit. Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(Rader, J.).  Judge Rader also voted against a rehearing en banc of that same case by the 
Federal Circuit. Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(Rader, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 126 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
1332 (2006); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Markman 
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 127 Compare Moore, supra note 14, at 239, with Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court 
Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14 (2001) (Prof. 
Moore, now Judge Moore of the Federal Circuit, completed two studies of claim 
construction reversals.  The first study found a 27% rate of verdicts reversed or vacated 
during the period 1996–2000, while the second study found a 29.7% rate of 
reversal/vacation for the period 1996–2003.). 
 128 See In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
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because the specification explains the invention in “plain” English, 
helping patent examiners, attorneys in an infringement action and 
courts interpret the claims.129  This is a difficult process, so much 
so that a recent study found that the Federal Circuit, upon de novo 
review of all claim constructions at the trial court level, has held 
that 34.5% of all such claim constructions have been wrongly 
construed at the trial court level.130  If one believes that process 
steps should not always be read into the claims, then one has to 
evaluate what the invention actually is from the process used to 
make it.131  It only makes sense that if one wants to describe what 
something is, describing how you made it is an inferior way to do 
so.  If one incorporates the process steps into the claim, little 
progress is made, because the first step in examining the claims 
will still always be what the product actually is.132  For that, there 
is the same problem as when the process steps do not limit the 
claim.  It only makes things simpler because one can now also 
examine part of the claim in the same way that courts examine 
process claims. 
As discussed in Part II, the Courts have disagreed over both the 
scope and the standard of allowability for product-by-process 
claims.133  The main reason why the courts cannot seem to agree 
on a single rule in each context is that sometimes the process steps 
seem more important for figuring out what the product is, and 
sometimes the process steps seem less important for making that 
determination.  When courts regard the process steps as more 
important, they tend to come to the same conclusion as Judge 
Newman and find that there are good reasons for treating product-
by-process claims differently based on the novelty of the 
product.134  Alternatively, when process steps are less important, 
courts typically construe these patents narrowly by using the 
process steps as claim limitations and requiring the Rule of 
 
 129 See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
 130 Moore, supra note 14, at 239. 
 131 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (citing In re Brown for the proposition that “in product-by-process claims the 
patentability of the product must be established independent of the process”). 
 132 See SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 439 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 133 See supra Part II. 
 134 See Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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Necessity.135  Since courts have disagreed over the scope and the 
standard for allowability of product-by-process claims for at least 
the last 40 years,136 it is clear that courts are ill-equipped to handle 
the product-by-process claims in every situation except when that 
is the only way the invention may be claimed. 
B. The Indistinctness of Claim Description in Product-by-Process 
Claims 
One consideration about all of these claims that is 
insufficiently addressed by all of the courts that have taken up the 
issue of product-by-process claims is the distinct claiming 
requirement.  Any patent applicant must conclude his patent 
application “with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards 
as his invention.”137  This requirement is located in the patent 
statute for two reasons: to provide notice to those who may 
practice similar inventions and to make the analysis easier for 
judges and patent examiners when determining the scope of the 
claims.138  Claim distinctiveness is analyzed “always in light of the 
teachings of the prior art and of the particular application 
disclosure as it would be interpreted by one possessing the 
ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art.”139  Recent decisions 
have tended to focus on the specific meaning of individual words 
in a claim.140 
 
 135 See In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216, 1219 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“While we recognize that 
several structural or characterizing terms derive from processes or methods and that their 
use in a claim will not prevent it from being considered to be a true product claim, we do 
not believe that the emphasized language in claim 8 can be considered to be anything 
other than a description of the shake in terms of the process by which it was made.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 136 See, e.g., Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp. 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992), 
reh’g en banc denied, 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Scripps, 927 F.2d 1565; In re 
Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345 (C.C.P.A. 
1969); In re Johnson, 394 F.2d 591 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Steppan, 394 F.2d 1013 
(C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 137 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 138 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.03. 
 139 In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (footnote omitted). 
 140 See, e.g., Personalized Media Comm’ns, LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 
696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson 
Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
MASKEL_FORMATTED_102606.DOC 11/1/2006  12:05 PM 
138 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:115 
The notice requirement tells possible users of patented products 
or processes what they can and cannot do.141  This is tremendously 
important for the efficiency of the patent marketplace.142  The 
typical analogy for patent claims is that they are akin to a land 
deed that tells others the boundary of their land.143  Taking the 
analogy further, imagine that instead of a fence, you had a fog-
making machine that spit out condensation over a ten-foot wide 
boundary between properties.  The two owners would either leave 
the boundary land unused or risk a lawsuit for trespass.  Either 
result creates significant economic inefficiencies.144 
Product-by-process claims make it extremely difficult to claim 
the invention with the certainty most patentees would expect.  First 
of all, even the Federal Circuit cannot agree on a clear standard for 
what these claims actually mean.145  This creates tremendous 
uncertainty for anyone who wants to innovate in a technological 
area where a product-by-process patent exists.146  Second, as 
emphasized supra in Section A, when a product claim uses process 
language, all the linguistic tools that courts and patent examiners 
bring to bear are much more difficult to apply.147 
One reason courts may have been unwilling to champion an 
approach that emphasized the lack of distinctiveness of product-
by-process claims is that the claims themselves are not necessarily 
 
 141 See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (“The object of the patent law in 
requiring the patentee to ‘particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, 
improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery’ is not only 
to secure to him all to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open 
to them.”). 
 142 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 1, at 29 (Oct. 2003) available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter 
FTC REPORT]. 
 143 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917). 
 144 FTC REPORT, supra note 142, ch. 1, at 29. 
 145 SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 439 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Atl. 
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Scripps Clinic & 
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 146 See Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) (“If 
competitors cannot be certain about a patent’s extent, they may be deterred from 
engaging in legitimate manufactures outside its limits, or they may invest by mistake in 
competing products that the patent secures.”). 
 147 See supra Part III.A. 
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ambiguous on their face.148  However, this argument misses the 
point because defining a product through process claims requires a 
significant inferential step.  The only direct analysis of a product-
by-process patent claim would be evaluating the novelty of the 
process.  As a result, there is a serious bootstrapping problem 
because the public then has to depend much more heavily on the 
specification to actually know what the product is, thus inverting 
the role of the two sections of a patent application. 
C. Problems with the Product-Focused Approach 
Much of product-by-process claim construction precedent can 
be summarized as falling into two camps.  One, exemplified by the 
Scripps approach, looks to the novelty of the product and does not 
read process limitations into the claim.149  The other, exemplified 
by the Atlantic Thermoplastics decision, looks largely to the 
process limitations in the claim to define it.150  This Section will 
examine the problems with the product-focused approach and why 
it fails to adequately address the problems with the distinctiveness 
of product-by-process claims. 
The first and most glaring problem with focusing on the 
product to the exclusion of the process is that it ignores the plain 
meaning of the claim.  Claims are used to define and limit the 
scope of patent protection.151  It would seem that if one is going to 
use process terms in the claim itself, that should limit the scope of 
patent protection to the process used to make the patent.152  
Normally, for a product patent, the specification will discuss the 
method by which the product is made, otherwise known as the 
 
 148 See, e.g., In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216, 1218 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“We cannot agree 
with the solicitor that defining a product in terms of process makes the language of the 
claims imprecise or indefinite. Their scope, if anything, is more definite in reciting a 
novel product made by a specific process, assuming, of course, that the process is clearly 
defined. It does not create a definiteness problem under § 112.”). 
 149 Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1583. 
 150 Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846–47 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 151 See, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908) 
(“[T]he claims measure the invention.”). 
 152 See, e.g., Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“It is 
also well settled that each element of a claim is material and essential, and that in order 
for a court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or 
its substantial equivalent in the accused device.”). 
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Enablement Requirement.153  When patent applicants use this type 
of claiming, it inverts the whole purpose of the claim in patent law.  
Instead of using the claim to limit the invention, now the patent 
applicant is using the specification in tandem with a description of 
the process to help tell the patent office and the engineering 
community what the product actually is. 
The requirement that claims give notice of the invention to the 
public creates unique problems when process steps are read out of 
product-by-process claims.  The usual justification for using a 
product-by-process claim is that it gives the inventor a chance to 
claim the invention without completely knowing what the product 
is.154  But if the inventor doesn’t know what the product is, how is 
the rest of the public supposed to know what the product is from 
the process steps mentioned in the invention?  Ignoring the process 
steps in an invention will only encourage the proliferation of 
patents that can be used as a way to litigate rather than innovate.  
The dispute between the Scripps and Atlantic Thermoplastics 
courts have done little to help make the scope of product-by-
process patents any clearer. 
D. Problems with the Approach of Atlantic Thermoplastics 
Much of the problems that arise from the Atlantic 
Thermoplastics decision are not from the content of the holding, 
but because the court made the law of product-by-process claims 
completely unclear.155  While the bulk of the Supreme Court and 
C.C.P.A. precedent was on that panel’s side, courts have long been 
muddled in their approach to product-by-process claims—
something not entirely admitted by the Atlantic Thermoplastics 
court.156  However, the Scripps holding was clear, and there was 
some support for it in cases both from the Supreme Court and the 
C.C.P.A.  Thus, the panel could have distinguished the Scripps 
holding in some way or stated that they were obligated to follow 
 
 153 See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 101, 106–07 (2005). 
 154 See Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(Newman, J., dissenting). 
 155 Atl. Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d 834. 
 156 Id. 
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the holding of Scripps.  Instead, the panel vehemently disagreed 
with it.157  Effectively, the court sacrificed clarity of the law for a 
favorable outcome in one case.  The members of the panel also 
refused to revisit the issue in an en banc decision, which may well 
have cleared up the dispute once and for all.158 
The holding in Atlantic Thermoplastics has only confused 
district courts that have had to construe product-by-process 
claims.159  Some courts agreed with the way that Atlantic 
Thermoplastics addressed precedent, finding that the Atlantic 
Thermoplastics court correctly based its decision on prior Supreme 
Court precedent.160 
Even a panel of the Federal Circuit itself in the SmithKline 
Beecham case refused to weigh in on the dispute.161  It appears to 
reflect the practice of common law appellate courts to attempt to 
decide cases on the narrowest grounds and do everything possible 
to avoid overruling precedent.162  Unfortunately, since the product 
itself was not novel,163 this case was not an appropriate candidate 
for en banc review because the case really did not depend on 
 
 157 Id. at 839 n.2. 
 158 See Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader, 
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 159 See Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics, GmbH, 126 F. Supp. 2d 16, 32 (D. 
Mass. 2000) (“Plainly, the law on this issue is in a state of uncertainty.  By denying the 
rehearing en banc, not only are lower courts left with little guidance, but so are the 
inventors and investors of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries who must 
make research and development decisions not knowing how much protection is available 
to a claim for a novel biological or chemical product.”); DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. 
Northrup King Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14275, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“It cannot be 
questioned that there is a direct conflict between the rule enunciated in Scripps and the 
one set forth in Atlantic Thermoplastics.”); Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc. 825 F. Supp. 7, 
8 (D. Mass. 1993) (“Unfortunately, the judges of the Federal Circuit Court are in open 
disagreement on the point, making such prediction hazardous.”). 
 160 AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 234 F. Supp. 2d 711, 739, n.1 (S.D. Ohio 2002). 
 161 SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 439 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 162 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“Even when 
the decision to overrule a prior case is not, as in the rare, latter instance, virtually 
foreordained, it is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable 
command’. . . Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is 
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to 
test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to 
gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”). 
 163 SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1317. 
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whether the process steps were read into the claim.164  However, 
the only action that will give lower courts some real guidance is an 
en banc decision by the Federal Circuit, review by the Supreme 
Court or a new statute by Congress.  As of July 30, 2006, there is 
no plan to include any provision regarding product-by-process 
claims in the most recent round of statutory patent reforms.165 
III. BACK TO THE FUTURE: RE-EMPHASIZING DISTINCTIVE 
CLAIMING AND THE RULE OF NECESSITY 
The solution to this labyrinth of conflicting precedent and 
unclear claiming schemes is twofold.  First, the patent office 
should only accept product-by-process claims where there is no 
other alternative way at the time of filing to claim the product.  The 
burden should be on the applicant to show that he must claim in 
this manner.  Second, courts must construe product-by-process 
claims as limited by the process because that is the only way to 
solve the issue of definiteness and maintain the traditional role of 
claims in a patent.  This part will argue for these reforms and also 
analyze foreign approaches to product-by-process claims, which 
largely support this thesis. 
A. The Rule of Necessity Should Be Revived 
The Rule of Necessity requires that patent applicants only 
claim using product-by-process language when there is no other 
way to claim the invention.166  This rule should be re-emphasized 
because to do otherwise severely limits the ability of third parties 
to have a reasonable expectation of what the patent actually 
covers.167  It also makes patent claims more clear because it 
 
 164 See id. at 1319 n.7. 
 165 The most recent bill to comprehensively amend the patent laws will probably not 
pass during the 109th Congress. Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform: Issa’s Litigation Pilot 
Gains Support (HR 5418), July 28, 2006, PATENTLY-O, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2006/07/patent_reform_i.html; see Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
 166 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.05[2][a]. 
 167 See In re Hughes, 496 F.2d 1216, 1218 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“If there is a basis for the 
[Rule of Necessity], it resides in the fact that it may be more difficult to determine from a 
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resolves much of the ambiguity over whether to define the 
invention in terms of the claims, instead of indirectly through the 
specification. 
As discussed supra in Part II, Section B of this Note, defining 
an invention in terms of the process used to make it is an inferior 
way to claim because it forces courts to make inferential steps that 
invite contradictory opinions.168  The Rule of Necessity would 
address these concerns in many of these situations because it 
would limit the number of patents that incorporate product-by-
process claims.  There is no Constitutional right to obtain a patent 
for an invention that is merely difficult to claim without using the 
language of the process used to make it.  If the invention is a useful 
product, there is no reason why the applicant cannot claim it in 
means-plus-function language as another way to avoid the 
structural requirements of traditional product claim language.169  
Also, if the product is really that difficult to characterize in 
structural terms, a patent examiner should be highly skeptical that 
the applicant actually possesses the invention that he claims.  This 
may be one way to alter the substantive law of patents to 
encourage fewer frivolous patents. 
Also, by limiting product-by-process claims to those that can 
be claimed in no other way, the process of interpreting the claims 
becomes easier by shifting the primary focus of the scope of the 
patent back to its claims.  If there are ways to define an invention 
outside of claim language, courts will inevitably depend on the 
specification more heavily to describe the invention.  But if the 
Rule of Necessity is followed, then courts will have to closely 
examine the process clauses in the claim because there is no other 
way to understand what the invention actually is.  In sum, the Rule 
of Necessity would set up the right incentives for interpretation of 
claim language, imparting greater stability to the law. 
 
product-by-process claim what product is covered thereby.  One cannot read the words of 
the claim on an article unless he is able to find out how the article was made.”). 
 168 See supra Part III.B. 
 169 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (2006). 
MASKEL_FORMATTED_102606.DOC 11/1/2006  12:05 PM 
144 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:115 
B. Product-by-Process Claims Should Be Limited by the Process 
Steps Listed in the Claims 
Product-by-process claims should be limited to the process that 
is included in the language of the claims because it would also 
improve the definiteness of the claims.  This rule would maintain 
the traditional role of patent claims as defining and limiting the 
invention. 
Claims are the most crucial part of any patent—the foundation 
of the patent system—because they define the invention for 
comparison to the prior art for validity determinations and for 
comparison to the acts of the accused infringer.170  It is an oft-
repeated maxim that all claim language (except usually the 
preamble) serves to define and limit the invention.171  Product-by-
process claims provide a uniquely difficult problem because their 
very nature subverts this usual arrangement.  After SmithKline 
Beecham, these claims require courts and patent examiners to 
examine the scope of the claims first by inferring what the product 
that the patent seeks to obtain protection for actually is.172  If that 
product is novel, then claim construction depends on whether the 
Atlantic Thermoplastics or the Scripps decision should be 
followed.173  One way to make these claims more definite is to use 
the language of the claim to define the invention.  If the patentee 
does not know what product she has created from the process to 
define the claim, it is highly debatable that the notice function of 
claiming is satisfied.174  Folding process limitations into 
infringement determinations will help make patent claims much 
clearer. 
Another reason why process terms should be included in 
limiting the claims is that they restore the traditional role of the 
specification.  The specification is a crucial part of any patent 
because it helps patent examiners and courts interpret the patent 
 
 170 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(“The written description part of the specification itself does not delimit the right to 
exclude.  That is the function and purpose of claims.”). 
 171 Id. 
 172 See SmithKline Beecham v. Apotex, 439 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 173 See id. at 1319 n.7. 
 174 CHISUM, supra note 6, § 8.03. 
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and it serves to inform the public of the invention.175  Without 
reading process terms of a claim into the scope of the claim, the 
process terms become simply a method of understanding what the 
invention actually is.  Structuring a patent in this way removes any 
need to have a claim in the first place.  Requiring the process terms 
to actually limit the invention would restore the traditional balance 
between the specification and the claims. 
Another reason why process terms should be read into 
otherwise novel products for the purposes of infringement is that 
patent claims should be defined in the narrowest scope possible in 
the infringement context.176  This traditional method of interpreting 
claims in infringement suits is an important way of making sure 
that patentees cannot exclude others from making, using or selling 
products that they did not themselves invent.177  Making sure that 
process terms are read into the scope of the claims for infringement 
would reinforce this vital patent doctrine. 
Limiting claims to the process included in the claim for 
purposes of infringement is complementary to the Rule of 
Necessity.  The Rule of Necessity strongly discourages the use of 
product-by-process claiming, both when attempting to procure a 
patent and when examining the validity of the patent.  Reading 
process limitations into the scope of the claim works from the 
opposite end of the patent statutory scheme, that of infringement.  
Because these claims are so difficult to interpret, every clue to 
determine the scope of the claims is important.  These two rules 
serve the same master: increasing the distinctiveness of patent 
claiming. 
C. The Approach of Foreign Patent Law Supports this Reform 
Even though many foreign patent law systems are more 
properly grounded in a trade-based rationale than the “inducement 
 
 175 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000). 
 176 See Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(“The PTO’s treatment of product-by-process claims as a product claim for patentability 
is consistent with policies giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation.  That 
same rule, however, does not apply in validity and infringement litigation.”). 
 177 See In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
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to invent” rationale favored in the United States,178 the approach of 
foreign patent systems to product-by-process claims is instructive 
to this discussion.  To summarize, the approaches in Europe and 
Japan emphasize the Rule of Necessity, but are less clear on the 
subject of the scope of product-by-process claims for infringement. 
1. European Union 
The European Patent Office’s179 (“E.P.O.”) approach to 
product-by-process claims is restrictive with respect to the 
permissibility of product-by-process claims, but expansive in its 
view of infringement.  The E.P.O. also explicitly asserts that 
“[c]laims for products defined in terms of a process of manufacture 
are allowable only if the products as such fulfil [sic] the 
requirements for patentability. . .”180  But the E.P.O. also follows 
the Rule of Necessity, after the International Flavors case.181  In 
its Guidelines for Examination, the E.P.O. makes clear the scope of 
product-by-process claims by stating, “[a] claim defining a product 
in terms of a process is to be construed as a claim to the product as 
such.”182  The E.P.O. is also obligated to follow Article 64(2) of 
the European Patent Convention, which requires, “If the subject-
matter of the European patent is a process, the protection conferred 
by the patent shall extend to the products directly obtained by such 
 
 178 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 179 “The European Patent Office (EPO) grants European patents for the contracting 
states to the European Patent Convention (EPC), which was signed in Munich on 5 
October 1973 and entered into force on 7 October 1977.  It is the executive arm of the 
European Patent Organisation, an intergovernmental body set up under the EPC, whose 
members are the EPC contracting states.  The activities of the EPO are supervised by the 
Organisation’s Administrative Council, composed of delegates from the contracting 
states.” The European Patent Office, http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/ 
brochure/ general/e/epo_general.htm. 
 180 Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, European Patent Office, 
pt. C., ch. III., ¶ 4.7b, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/gui_lines/ 
pdf_2005/part_c_e.pdf [hereinafter E.P.O. Guidelines]. 
 181 Case T-150/82, Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 1984 O.J. E.P.O. 309 (TBA 1984) 
(“The Board takes the view that in order to minimise uncertainty, the form for a claim to 
a patentable product as such defined in terms of a process of manufacture (i.e. ‘product-
by-process claims’) should be reserved for cases where the product cannot be 
satisfactorily defined by reference to its composition, structure or some other testable 
parameters.”). 
 182 E.P.O. Guidelines, Part C., Ch. III., ¶ 4.7b. 
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process.”183  So, in the E.P.O., there really isn’t the same rationale 
for allowing product-by-process claims because process claims 
already supply the scope of coverage necessary to provide for 
product-by-process claims as such claims exist in the United States 
and the United Kingdom.184 
2. United Kingdom 
In the U.K. (a European Patent Convention member state), the 
most recent authoritative opinion on product-by-process claims is a 
decision written by Lord Hoffmann on behalf of the House of 
Lords.185  In Kirin-Amgen, Amgen held a European patent for 
making erythropoietin using recombinant DNA technology and 
sued for infringement.186  Two of the claims in Amgen’s patent 
were product-by-process claims.187  The defendant asserted that the 
claims were invalid for anticipation.188  On the question of 
invalidity for the first claim, the court held that since the patentee 
could depend on a process claim and Article 64(2) of the European 
Patent Convention to gain protection, the claim was invalid 
because it violated the Rule of Necessity.189  For the second claim, 
the court held that the claim was invalid for “insufficiency” (the 
U.K. analog to the enablement requirement in the U.S.) because 
the specification did not tell the public which method of 
purification would produce the purified erythropoietin.190  So, 
while the court did not have the occasion to determine the scope of 
the claims for infringement, it did uphold the Rule of Necessity in 
European patent law. 
 
 183 European Patent Convention, art. 64(2), available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/epc/e/ar64.html#A64. 
 184 See Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, at para. 
90 (U.K.). 
 185 Kirin-Amgen, [2004] UKHL 46. 
 186 Id. at para. 1. 
 187 Id. at paras. 14–15. 
 188 Id. at para. 2. 
 189 See id. at para. 101. 
 190 Id. at paras. 130–31. 
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3. Japan 
The Japanese Patent Office (“J.P.O.”) takes its own unique 
approach to the patentability of product-by-process claims.191  The 
J.P.O. has a two-part inquiry.192  A patent is clear enough for 
patentability when “a person skilled in the art can conceive a 
concrete product to be manufactured by such manufacturing 
process by taking into consideration the common general 
knowledge as of the filing. . .”193  But if it fails this form of a 
reasonable inventor standard, it can still be patented if it “cannot be 
properly identified unless defining the product by its 
manufacturing process” and “the relation between the product to 
be manufactured by such manufacturing process and the technical 
standard as of the filing can be understood.”194  The Guidelines go 
on to explain that “when the relation (difference) between the 
product to be manufactured by such manufacturing process and 
known products are shown with the experimental result or 
theoretical explanation, etc., the relation with the technical 
standard can be understood.”195  So in essence, the J.P.O. uses a 
reasonable inventor standard coupled with a modified form of the 
Rule of Necessity. 
These examples from other well-developed patent systems are 
useful to show alternative ways to address an extremely knotty 
problem.  These patent systems give strong support to the need in 
the United States to revive the Rule of Necessity.  However, they 
do not definitively side with either the Scripps or Atlantic 
Thermoplastics line of cases. 
D. Ways Future Litigants Can Argue Around the Scripps and 
Atlantic Thermoplastics Conflict 
As evidenced from the preceding sections of this Note, 
product-by-process claim construction precedent is extremely 
 
 191 Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model, Japanese Patent Office, Part I., 
Ch. 1, § 2.2.2.1, available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/Guidelines/ 
PartI-1.pdf. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
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contradictory and bright line rules are difficult to determine.  
However, litigants will continue to argue in Markman hearings 
over the scope of product-by-process claims, without the benefit of 
a precedential decision that clearly informs the parties what the 
rules of the game actually are.  This section addresses the types of 
arguments that litigants may make to distinguish their case. 
Now that the SmithKline decision is available to litigants,196 the 
most obvious way that parties will attempt to avoid the conflicting 
decisions in Scripps197 and Atlantic Thermoplastics198 is by 
latching onto the language in SmithKline stating, “[r]egardless of 
how broadly or narrowly one construes a product-by-process 
claim, it is clear that such claims are always to a product, not a 
process.”199  Therefore, in lawsuits where anticipation is at issue, 
like in SmithKline, the patentee should try to argue that the product 
implied by the claims is new compared to the prior art without any 
analysis of the process used to make it.  In some ways, this is 
simply verbal trickery because it does not really solve anything 
except giving courts a way to ignore the decisions in Scripps and 
Atlantic Thermoplastics.  One still has to interpret claims to a 
product based on what the process terms in the claim say because 
that is how the invention is defined.  However, there was room for 
the panel in SmithKline to agree with that argument, but only Judge 
Newman thought that the issue was fully reserved on appeal200 and 
that the product was actually new.201 
The real essence of the dispute between the decisions in 
Scripps and Atlantic Thermoplastics is: how will the courts 
construe product-by-process claims for the purposes of 
infringement?  One tactic is to argue that the decisions are not 
actually in conflict, similar to the argument that Judge Newman 
made in her SmithKline dissent.202  In this line of reasoning, one 
 
 196 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 197 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
 198 Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992), reh’g en 
banc denied, 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 199 SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1317. 
 200 Id. at 1324–25. 
 201 Id. at 1324. 
 202 Id. at 1323. 
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would argue that the Scripps decision applies only to “true 
product-by-process” claims, where the process is necessary to 
define the invention because there is no other way to define it.203  
If, instead, the litigant wanted to argue that the process terms 
should limit the claim, that litigant would argue that it really is a 
“product of the process” claim, where the court in Atlantic 
Thermoplastics interpreted process terms as limiting the scope of 
the invention.204  This argument uses Judge Newman’s distinction 
between the different classes of claims in Scripps versus Atlantic 
Thermoplastics, but leaves untouched the different standards from 
the two cases.  The danger in this tactic is that cogent dissents by 
Judge Newman, rather than any Federal Court majority opinion, 
provide the best support for this approach.205 
Another way that a litigant might effectively navigate the 
troubled waters of product-by-process jurisprudence is by arguing 
that the en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH206 suggests that the 
specification should be relied on more heavily when interpreting 
the claims.  As discussed earlier in this Note,207 product-by-process 
claims almost inevitably lead to increased reliance on the 
specification to determine the scope of the patent.  While on one 
hand, the court in the Phillips decision stated that “[i]t is a 
‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define 
the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to 
exclude,’”208 on the other hand, the court re-emphasized the 
importance of the specification in claim interpretation.209  Since 
product-by-process claims are so difficult to interpret and the 
disclosure in the specification is helpful to a litigant’s case, the 
litigant should convince the court that the specification controls, 
rather than getting pulled into an uncertain argument over whether 
Scripps or Atlantic Thermoplastics applies. 
 
 203 Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1282. 
 204 See id. 
 205 SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1323; Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1281–84 
(Newman, J., dissenting the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 206 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 207 See discussion supra Parts III.B., III.C., IV.A. and IV.B. 
 208 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (citations omitted). 
 209 Id. at 1315–17. 
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Unfortunately for savvy litigants, trial court forum shopping is 
unlikely to pay dividends.  Since the Atlantic Thermoplastics 
decision was handed down, at least two identical U.S. District 
Courts have discussed the conflicting law of product-by-process 
claims.  However, these two courts have either followed opposing 
rules or distinguished the cases such that they did not have to 
address the dispute.  In the District of Massachusetts, the Tropix 
court held that it would follow Atlantic Thermoplastics because it 
reflected the opinion of the majority of the Federal Circuit and it 
was more properly grounded in prior precedent.210  Also in the 
District of Massachusetts, the Trustees of Columbia University 
court did not treat the Tropix decision as controlling law and 
applied Scripps because it was the prior precedent, controlling 
under the Federal Circuit Rules.211  In the District of Delaware, the 
Mannington Mills court applied Scripps,212 but a recent decision 
also in Delaware distinguished its case from the conflict over 
product-by-process claims based on the definition of claim terms 
in the specification.213  This most recent decision did not even cite 
Mannington Mills.214  Therefore, there is little hope that a litigant 
will be able to find a forum where the court will predictably apply 
either Atlantic Thermoplastics or Scripps. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The history of product-by-process claim construction and use is 
one of conflicting precedent.  It is time for an authority such as the 
en banc Federal Circuit to take up an appropriate case and decide 
on a single rule.  Because product-by-process claims are such an 
inferior way to describe an invention, the Federal Circuit should 
adopt a Rule of Necessity, requiring that patent applicants only use 
product-by-process claims when necessary.  The burden to show 
 
 210 See Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D. Mass. 1993). 
 211 Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 126 F. Supp. 2d 16, 32 (D. 
Mass. 2000). 
 212 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 594 (D. 
Del. 2002). 
 213 Cryovac, Inc. v. Pechiney Plastic Packaging, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19144, 
at *13 (D. Del. 2006). 
 214 Cryovac, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19144. 
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that product-by-process claims are necessary should be borne by 
the patent applicant.  The Federal Circuit should also hold that 
process limitations should be read into every product-by-process 
claim because the claims are indefinite.  Process limitations also 
make sense because it reaffirms the principle that the claims should 
define the limits of the invention, not the specification.  These 
reforms would restore a sense of balance to the patent system by 
limiting issued patents to the narrowest scope of invention for what 
the applicant actually has invented. 
 
